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Abstract 
The Capital Structure issue has been a matter of debate since Modigliani and Miller 
(1958). Theories and empirical studies regarding this topic abound, but there is still not 
a consensus on the determinants of the choice between equity and debt. The aim of this 
study is to contribute to this research area and to see whether there are differences, or 
not, on the determinants of capital structure between two groups of companies: 
companies from northern European countries and southern European countries. The 
recent financial and sovereign debt crisis divided Europe into two regions. One region 
composed by safe countries, in the north, and another represented by the countries under 
austerity measures, in the south. This would lead to higher difficulties in accessing debt 
funds by companies from south of Europe countries and to differences in the way those 
companies are financed.  
The results showed that the significant variables in one country are not necessarily 
significant in others. Besides, it was found that there are differences in the determinants 
of capital structure between northern and southern European companies, mainly 
regarding firms’ size and profitability, assets’ tangibility and non-debt tax shield. 
 
Key-words: Capital Structure, Capital Structure Theories, Capital Structure 
Determinants, Sovereign Debt. 
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1. Introduction 
The Capital Structure topic has been a matter of debate since the irrelevance theorem of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958). Theories and empirical studies regarding this theme 
abound. Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) proposed the Trade-off Theory, where a 
company’s amount of debt results from balancing its costs and advantages. Myers and 
Majluf (1984) proposed the Pecking Order Theory that states that companies favor 
internal to external funds, and debt to equity. Later, Baker and Wurgler (2002) proposed 
the Market Timing Theory that suggested managers issue (repurchase) shares when the 
price of their shares (measured by the price to book value ratio) is high (low).  
Empirically, researchers tried to determine which variables impact the companies’ 
financing choices, and concluded that they can be the firms’ characteristics (size, 
profitability, earnings volatility or asset tangibility) or the countries’ institutions 
(culture, legal system or corruption level, for example). Nevertheless, there is still not a 
consensus regarding those determinants. 
Usually, the studies apply to different samples of countries. Concerning Europe, some 
focused only in one country, like U.K. (Ozkan, 2001) or Spain (De Miguel and Pindado, 
2001). Others are dedicated to a group of European countries (Antoniou et al., 2002 or 
Hall et al., 2004). But few studies compared groups of countries. For instance, Acedo-
Ramíres and Ruiz-Cabestre (2014), distinguished market-oriented economies from 
bank-oriented, and Bancel and Mittoo (2004) found differences in the determinants of 
capital structure between Scandinavian and non-Scandinavian countries. 
The recent financial crisis originated a sovereign debt crisis in Europe because 
governments, mainly in Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Spain and Cyprus, bailed out 
bankrupt banks, increasing their public debt, their bond yields (Kantar et al., 2014) and 
the yield spread (Dell'erba et al., 2013), which created difficulties in the repayment of 
debt, leading to austerity programs (Apergis and Cooray, 2014). For Moro (2014), 
Eurozone countries are completely separated into the “prosperous North (Germany, 
Austria, Netherlands and Finland) and those of the austerity-hit South (France, Italy, 
Spain, Greece and Portugal)
1.” (p. S23). Furthermore, many times, northern and 
southern Europe countries are compared regarding their cultural differences and the 
                                                          
1
 Lately in this work, the countries under study will be presented, as well as their classification (between 
northern and southern), which is quite different from that of Moro (2014). 
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opposite characteristics of their people: while northerners are seen as more honest, hard-
workers and “cold” people, southerners are seen as less honest and lazier. These 
contrasting characteristics may lie on the basis of the crisis. 
To the extent of our knowledge, no work explored the differences in the determinants of 
capital structure between the companies from countries in the north and in the south of 
Europe. This study will try to fill this gap. First, it studies whether southern companies 
use more or less debt than northern companies. On the one hand the formers can be 
more indebted (as southern countries tend to rely more than northern countries on debt 
as can be seen by their public debt levels) but, on the other hand, the cost of debt is 
higher is the southern countries, which according to the Trade-off Theory will led to 
less levered capital structures. Second, this study will analyze if there are differences in 
the determinants of capital structure between the groups of countries described above. 
Besides, this study will also help us to understand which capital structure determinants 
are more relevant in each group of countries. Finally, the link between public and 
private debt will be studied by testing whether the level of public debt is a significant 
explanatory variable to the firm’s financing decisions. 
The results showed that southern companies are smaller but have higher proportion of 
fixed assets, and have higher levels of debt than northern companies. Furthermore, it 
was found that firms’ profitability, size, assets’ tangibility and the non-debt tax shield 
are relevant in explaining the debt level.  
It was also found that the companies, apart from being separated into northern and 
southern, can be distinguished considering the level of public debt of the country where 
they are stablished.  
Finally, it was found that, in fact, there are differences in the determinants of firms’ 
capital structure across the groups of countries considered. 
The rest of this dissertation is divided in 5 sections. Section 2 corresponds to the 
literature review, where previous theories and studies are summarized. Later, in section 
3 the methodological aspects of this work are described. Section 4 analyzes the results 
obtained. Finally, in section 5 the conclusions are summarized and suggestions for 
future research are presented.  
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2. Literature review 
“I will start by asking, ‘How do firms choose their capital structures? Again, the 
answer is, ‘We don’t know’.”. Myers (1984) (p.575). 
2.1. Introduction 
The capital structure of a company corresponds to the combination of equity and debt 
that it uses to finance its activities. The importance of choosing an appropriate capital 
structure is that it allows companies to reduce their cost of financing and maximize their 
value. 
This has been one of the most debated issues in Finance since the irrelevance theorem 
of Modigliani and Miller (1958), who argued that, under some assumptions, the capital 
structure is irrelevant for a firm’s value. However, those assumptions do not prevail in 
the real world and so it is not indifferent for the firms’ valuation the combination of 
equity and debt used.  
Attempting to find an answer for the question of how companies choose their capital 
structures, theories for the capital structure have emerged. One of those theories is the 
Trade-off Theory, proposed by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Scott (1976), Kim 
(1978), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Grinblatt and Titman (2002). Other theory 
proposed is the Pecking Order Theory, suggested by authors like Myers and Majluf 
(1984) and Myers (1984). Then, the Market Timing theory was defended by Baker and 
Wurgler (2002).  
In this section we will present the Modigliani and Miller contributions, as well as the 
main capital structure theories. Besides, a review of the empirical studies regarding the 
determinants of capital structure will be made. 
2.2. Modigliani and Miller Contributions  
The capital structure topic has been a matter of debate since Modigliani and Miller 
(1958). As companies have different ways to finance their investments, the challenge is 
to identify the one that yields the lowest cost of capital and maximizes the firm value. 
According to the Proposition I of those authors, “the market value of a firm is 
independent of its capital structure” (p. 268) and is only related to its profitability, so the 
capital structure problem is not a problem, if it is assumed that the capital markets are 
perfect, have no frictions, investors have homogeneous expectations and there are no 
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arbitrage opportunities. However in a world with taxes and other market imperfections, 
it is proved that the capital structure is relevant to the cost of capital and to the firm’s 
market value.  
Later, in 1963, Modigliani and Miller  presented a correction to their previous paper, 
since they found that the market value of a company is dependent on the expected after-
tax return, on the tax rate and on the degree of leverage, which means that the capital 
structure is not irrelevant for the firm’s value. Nevertheless, they emphasized that the 
fact that debt is related to a tax shield does not mean that companies should be only 
financed by debt. First, because there are other sources of financing, like the retained 
earnings, that can be cheaper. Second, because some lenders define limits to the amount 
they lend to a given company. Finally, the authors’ data did not show that, even in a 
context with high tax rates, that are associated with higher tax advantages, the leverage 
increased.  
Knowing that the way a company is financed is not indifferent for its valuation and that 
markets have frictions, theories for the capital structure have emerged. 
2.3. Capital Structure Theories 
2.3.1. Trade-off Theory 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) extend the work of Modigliani and Miller (1963) and 
while including the impact of market imperfections, such as the existence of taxes and 
bankruptcy costs, developed what is called the Trade-off Theory (because there exists a 
trade-off between the present value of the tax shield originated by a marginal increase in 
debt and the present value of the marginal bankruptcy costs).  
According to the theory, when choosing the amount of debt, a company considers that 
on the one hand, higher debt means greater tax rebate, but on the other hand, higher debt 
may lead to bankruptcy, which has huge costs such as the fact that firm’s assets may be 
sold at a value below its economic value.  The bankruptcy can also led to the reduction 
in sales (Titman, 1984), to the delays of production, the payment of fees to lawyers or 
accountants and the loss of tax credits. So, the existence of a tax advantage related to 
debt should be balanced with the bankruptcy cost disadvantages.  
Since this theory balances the advantages and disadvantages of debt, it defends the 
existence of an optimal capital structure (the one that generates the lowest cost of 
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capital) that results from the best combination between debt and equity
2
. However, not 
all firms are in its optimal debt-to-equity ratio, since, as stated by Myers (1984), there 
are adjustment costs that arise from changing from one capital structure to another
3
. 
Morover, for Hovakimian et al. (2001) there are impediments that prevent firms to 
adjust towards their target ratio, which also changes over time. 
In his contribution, Kim (1978) stated that the tax savings and the bankruptcy costs 
should only be balanced if the debt capacity of a firm, that is, “the maximum amount of 
debt that a firm with given investments can borrow in a perfect capital market” (p. 52), 
is higher than the optimal amount of debt that the firm should have. This leads to the 
conclusion that, even if a firm is able to increase its leverage it should not do so until 
reach the risk of bankruptcy. At the debt capacity, the increase in the debt level and in 
the debt payments leads to an increase in bankruptcy costs, and the present value of tax 
savings remains almost the same, which decreases the firm’s value. So, there may be a 
given amount of debt payments (and, as a consequence, of debt) that leads to the 
maximum firm’s value and “… the optimal capital structure [associated with the 
optimal amount of debt] involves less debt financing than the firm’s debt capacity.” 
(Kim, 1978, p.55). 
Apart from balancing only the tax advantages and the bankruptcy costs, there are other 
authors that, regarding the Trade-off Theory, include also the agency costs. Those costs 
were pointed out at first by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and are associated with the 
separation between ownership and control (that lead to conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and managers) and with the conflicts between shareholders and 
debtholders.  
According to Jensen (1986), debt (despite being related to bank costs) allows to reduce 
the conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers. In the case of high levels of 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) the agency costs are very high since the discretionary power of 
managers is large, however if a company has debt obligations (like the payment of the 
interests and the principal), managers cannot spend that resources indiscriminately, at 
                                                          
2
 Marsh (1982) proved that companies choose their capital structure as they have a target ratio in mind. 
Ozkan (2001), De Miguel and Pindado (2001) and Antoniou et al. (2002), also confirmed that firms adjust 
their target ratio. 
3
 Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre (2014) found that UK companies adjust to their target debt level 
more rapidly than other continental European countries, because the transaction costs faced by the 
English companies are lower. 
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the expense of shareholders and so the existence of debt implies more control and better 
management of companies. In the author words, “These control effects of debt are a 
potential determinant of capital structure.” (p. 324).  
Concerning the agency costs between shareholders and debtholders, Grinblatt and 
Titman (2002) found that they distort the investment decisions. For example, 
sometimes, shareholders want to take risky projects, even if they have a negative 
present value. This decision may be good for them, but leads to an increase in the return 
required by debtholders, reducing the value of existing bonds. The authors also 
concluded that equityholders are more concerned about short-term returns and, 
consequently, give-up from investments associated with long-run returns, even if they 
are more profitable. Moreover, they argued that in the presence of debt, shareholders 
want to keep the company alive even if it values more if liquidated.  
Given that lenders recognize those distortions, they will take actions in order that 
shareholders bear the costs of the distortions, for example by increasing the borrowing 
costs, by limiting the amount they lend, or by using covenants.  
2.3.2. Pecking Order Theory 
Another theory regarding capital structure proposed is the Pecking Order Theory (POT) 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984) that states that firms, facing an investment opportunity, prefer 
to use internal funds instead of external funds. So, this theory does not predict the 
existence of an optimal capital structure. Also, in the case external funds are required, 
firms favor debt against equity, since debt is safer than equity (Myers, 1984) and the 
loss in the firm’s value using debt is lower. This occurs because there is asymmetric 
information between managers and investors (the former know more about the company 
and the latter recognize this). According to the authors, the issuance of debt tells the 
investors that the company is able to meet its debt obligations and has opportunities to 
grow. Conversely, the issuance of new shares is not welcomed by shareholders, since 
they interpret that as a signal that the company is overvalued and, as was proved, leads 
to a decrease in shares’ price.. 
According to Myers (2001), the POT allows to distinguish profitable from non-
profitable companies, because the former have higher internal funds and do not need to 
issue as much debt or equity as the latter. For him, “Each firm’s debt ratio therefore 
reflects its cumulative requirement for external financing.” (p. 93). 
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2.3.3. Market Timing Theory 
Considering that the theories described above could not completely describe and explain 
the decisions made by managers regarding the sources of financing, several other 
theories were proposed recently. From those, the Market Timing Theory purposed by 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) defended that the “capital structure is the cumulative 
outcome of past attempts to time the equity market” (p. 1) and is not associated with the 
existence of an optimal capital structure. They concluded that market timing affects the 
capital structure in a persistent manner.  
This strategy implies that managers track the evolution of its market-to-book (MtB) 
ratio, and it is proved that they issue equity when the market value is higher than its 
book value and past market values, and they repurchase shares when the market value is 
lower. This implies a negative relation between the market value and the level of debt. 
Managers justify this behavior stating that “if our stock price has recently risen, the 
price at which we can sell is ‘high’”4. And one can add that if the stock price has 
dropped, they can buy it at a lower price. This way of acting allows to profit from 
differences in the cost of equity relative to the cost of other sources of financing. 
This recent theory is hard to conciliate with the previous ones because, for example, the 
POT says that leverage increases to finance future investments, but these authors found 
that this is determined by past values of MtB. Regarding the Trade-off Theory, it states 
that “capital structure eventually adjusts to changes in the market-to-book ratio” (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2002, p. 25), but the same authors affirm that “variation in the market-to-
book ratio has a decades-long impact on capital structure.” (p.25). 
 
2.4. Traditional Determinants of Capital Structure 
“[T]he capital structure decision of a firm is not only the product of its own 
characteristics but also the result of environment and tradition in which it operates.” 
(Antoniou et al., 2002, p. 19) 
Researchers have been attempting to prove the impact of the theories described above 
on companies’ capital structure and also to find the determinants of those financial 
structures, which can be related to firm-specific characteristics or can depend on the 
                                                          
4
 This statement results from a survey made by Graham, J. R. and C. R. Harvey (2001), "The theory and 
practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field", Journal of Financial Economics, 60(2-3), 187-
243. (p. 216). 
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macroeconomic environment, country’s institutions5 or industry in which the firm 
operates.  
According to Harris and Raviv (1991), in their summary of the existing literature, the 
firm characteristics usually mentioned to explain capital structures’ decisions are the 
amount of fixed assets hold by companies, the non-debt tax shield, the investment 
opportunities, the firm’s size, the volatility, the advertising and R&D expenditures, the 
probability of bankruptcy, the profitability and the uniqueness of the product
6
. The 
impact of each of these determinants may vary across studies, although there is some 
consensus regarding specific variables
7
. 
2.4.1. Companies’ size 
Regarding the size of the companies, Ferri and Jones (1979) found a positive relation 
between this variable and the leverage, which is justifiable by the fact that larger firms 
are more diversified and, because of that, are less risky, have higher credit ratings, lower 
interest rates and so are more likely to have larger amounts of debt. Consequently, 
according to the Trade-off theory, there is a positive relation between leverage and the 
size of a firm.  
Besides, Michaelas et al. (1999) argued that smaller firms are less profitable, so enjoy 
less the tax shields originated by debt, and are more likely to go bankrupt. Given that, 
Michaelas et al (1999) and others
8
 defended a positive impact of firm size on leverage. 
Conversely, Ozkan (2001) got a negative, although not significant, relation between size 
and leverage, which can be justified by the fact that larger firms have lower degrees of 
                                                          
5
 Rajan and Zingales (1995) studied the determinants of the capital structure in G7 countries to see if they 
are similar to the ones observed in US companies. The pertinence of their study is that, on the one hand, 
since those countries are similar, it is possible to expect that the financial structures are also similar. On 
the other hand, each country has specific institutions regarding accounting and bankruptcy rules, legal 
environments and the role of banks (some are bank-oriented countries and others are market-oriented) and 
securities markets, which would lead to differences in financing decisions. However, they concluded that 
differences that exist in capital structures across those countries “are not easily explained by institutional 
differences previously though important.”. 
Other authors like Antoniou et al. (2002) and Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre (2014) also 
distinguished market-oriented countries from bank-oriented countries. Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre 
(2014) found significant differences in terms of the determinants of capital structure across both groups of 
countries, mainly regarding the effective tax rate, the financial distress costs (measured by the value of 
intangible assets), the investment in net fixed assets, the cash flow, the firm size and the market return. 
6
 Titman and Wessels (1988) connected the uniqueness of a firm’s product with debt ratios, and found 
that they are negatively related, that is, the more specialized a company is, the less indebted it should be. 
Their findings support Titman (1984). 
7
 In Appendix A it is possible to find a summary of the determinants of capital structure used in this study 
and their impact on the level of debt, according to the different theories. 
8
 Chui et al. (2002), Antoniou et al. (2002), Frank and Goyal (2009) – who measured the size by the 
amount of book assets - Fan et al. (2012) and Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre (2014). 
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asymmetric information and have no problem in issuing equity instead of debt
9
. So, the 
POT predicts a negative relation between leverage and firm’s size. On their study, Hall 
et al. (2004) found evidence to support the positive and the negative relation: the 
positive occurs for long-term debt and the negative for short-term debt. Marsh (1982) 
also considered size an important explanatory variable for leverage. 
2.4.2 Volatility 
Concerning the volatility of firm’s earnings, the existence of “non-trivial”10 bankruptcy 
costs should lead to an opposite relation between the variability of earnings and the 
amount of debt, which is in accordance with the prediction of the Trade-off theory. The 
POT also predicts a negative relation between these two variables and the reasoning is 
that profitable firms with volatile earnings should reduce debt or invest in cash and 
securities to ensure that in the future they can raise debt if they need to. Nevertheless, 
Ferri and Jones (1979) did not found any evidence of a negative relation, as was found 
by Bradley et al. (1984) and Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre (2014). On the other 
hand, Michaelas et al. (1999) found a positive relation between volatility and gearing, 
probably due to relatively lower costs of financial distress. 
2.4.3 Fixed Assets 
The impact of fixed assets on leverage, according to Ferri and Jones (1979), is negative 
because they can enlarge the variability of the firm’s income, hindering the access to 
debt. This is supported by Hall et al. (2004), but just for the short-term debt. However, 
other authors like Michaelas et al. (1999) (and Hall et al. (2004) for the long-term) 
found that the higher the amount of fixed assets a firm has, the higher the level of debt 
that it will have on its capital structure, because the assets can be used as collateral in 
debt contracts and lenders will ask for a low risk premium. Besides, the existence of 
collaterals in a debt contract limits the use of the funds made by managers, reducing the 
agency costs. Because of that, the Trade-off theory predicts that leverage and tangibility 
are positively related (Zurigat, 2009). This positive effect is also supported by the POT, 
as the assets used as collateral will allow issuing debt at interesting rates. Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Frank and Goyal (2009), Fan et al. (2012), and Acedo-Ramírez and 
Ruiz-Cabestre (2014) got the same results. Antoniou et al. (2002) found evidence that 
support both the negative and the positive effect of tangible assets on leverage, 
                                                          
9
 This justification was suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1995), who actually did not understand why 
they found a positive relation between size and debt in all countries, except in Germany. 
10
 Bradley et al (1984), p. 858. 
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depending on the country. This variable is also considered relevant in explaining 
companies’ leverage by Marsh (1982). 
2.4.4. Non Debt Tax Shield and Tax Gains 
Another determinant of capital structure can be the non-debt tax shield (NDTS). 
According to Ozkan (2001), if a company can have tax shields arising from a source 
different from debt interest, like tax deductions for depreciations (Deangelo and 
Masulis, 1980)
11
, then, it has no advantage in issuing debt. So, the authors predicted, 
and proved, that there is a negative relation between non-debt tax shield and leverage. 
This negative relation is supported by the Trade-off theory, as it states that the 
advantage of increasing debt is related with the taxes that are saved due to the payment 
of interests. However, Bradley et al. (1984) and Michaelas et al. (1999) found a positive 
relation between these variables. According to Bradley et al (1984), this evidence is 
puzzling, but considering that the firms that have higher amounts of depreciations are 
the same firms that have higher values of tangible assets, they can easily access to bank 
loans and get friendly interest rates. 
According to Antoniou et al. (2002), the relation between debt level and tax rate can be 
positive (because a higher tax rate is associated with higher tax gains from leverage, 
increasing debt, as predicted by the Trade-off theory), or negative (as a higher corporate 
tax decreases the internal funds, increases the cost of capital and decreases debt). 
Overall, those authors and Michaelas et al. (1999) found an insignificant relation 
between tax rate and leverage. But, for Fan et al. (2012) and Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-
Cabestre (2014) the relation was positive and significant. 
2.4.5. Profitability 
Following the predictions of the POT, more profitable firms should have lower amounts 
of debt in their balance sheets because they will use their internal returns in first place. 
Due to that, a negative relation between profitability and leverage would be expected. 
Michaelas et al. (1999) and others
12
 found a negative coefficient for profitability, which 
is consistent with the POT. In opposition, the Trade-off Theory says that, as profitable 
                                                          
11
 These authors argued that “the existence of corporate tax shield substitutes for debt such as accounting 
depreciation deductions and investment tax credits.” (pp. 26-27). 
12
 Ozkan (2001), Chui et al (2002), Hall et al. (2004), Frank and Goyal (2009) and Fan et al. (2012). 
Antoniou et al. (2002) found a negative relation between profitability and leverage in France and in the 
UK, due to the fact that French firms are mainly privately held, distribute lower dividends and have more 
internal resources. Rajan and Zingales (1995) found a negative relation in all countries, except in 
Germany. Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre (2014) found a negative relation. 
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companies have higher amounts of Free Cash Flow (FCF), in order to lower the agency 
costs and to commit managers to use the internal resources in a responsible manner, 
these companies should have higher levels of debt (Jensen, 1986, and Harris and Raviv, 
1991).  
2.4.6. Liquidity 
Another determinant of capital structure might be firm’s liquidity. The existence of 
agency costs and conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders may lead to 
a negative relation between this variable and the amount of debt (Ozkan, 2001). 
Besides, more liquid firms can use their own funds to finance their investments, 
decreasing the leverage, which is consistent with the POT. Ozkan (2001) confirmed this 
inverse relation and Antoniou et al. (2002) proved the negative relation in the UK, due 
to the fact that this is a market-oriented economy, which has no close relations with 
banks, being hard to get loans. 
2.4.7. Growth Opportunities 
Regarding the impact of the growth opportunities, which correspond to capital assets 
that are valuable for the company but that cannot be collateralized (because they are 
intangible) and are most of the times measured by the market-to-book ratio, the POT 
predicts a positive relation between this variable and leverage, because firms with more 
investment projects will need more external funds, and as debt is preferred against 
equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984), the leverage will increase. However, Ozkan (2001) 
and others
13
, found a negative relation, arguing that the existence of risky debt on 
balance sheets may prevent firms from issuing more debt, passing up some investment 
opportunities.  
Furthermore, according to the Market Timing Theory, when the stock price is high 
relative to earnings or book value, firms prefer to issue equity, since they can sell the 
new shares at higher prices, thus, reducing the amount of debt. So, this theory expects a 
negative relation between gearing and growth opportunities, as was proved by Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) and by Antoniou et al. (2002). The inverse relation is also 
supported by Frank and Goyal (2009) and Fan et al. (2012).  
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 Myers (1977) adds that the issuance of risky debt leads to suboptimal investment strategies, decreasing 
the firm’s market value. 
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The Trade-off theory also predicts a negative relation between growth opportunities and 
the debt level because, as the intangible assets cannot be used as collateral, their value 
will decline rapidly in case of bankruptcy (Zurigat, 2009) and lenders will demand 
higher interest rates, increasing the cost of debt and decreasing the level of gearing. 
Additionally, the existence of conflicts of interests between shareholders and 
bondholders, when a company has debt and investment opportunities, leads managers to 
take investment decisions that are not optimal. According to Billett et al. (2007), there 
are mechanisms like short-term debt (Myers, 1977) and covenants that reduce those 
conflicts. In the absence of these mechanisms, the solution for the companies to reduce 
the disputes is to decrease the debt, which implies that firms with more growth 
opportunities have lower leverage. But, Billett et al. (2007) predicted and concluded that 
the introduction of covenants on debt contracts leads to a positive relation between 
leverage and growth opportunities. This positive relation was found by Michaelas et al. 
(1999) and by Hall et al. (2004) for short-term debt in all countries and in the UK, 
Portugal and Italy, individually. Also, Titman and Wessels (1988), when considering 
the ratio of debt (long or short-term debt and convertible debt) to book value of equity, 
found a positive association between those ratios and growth opportunities. The 
rationale is that growth opportunities create value to the firm, increasing its debt 
capacity and, consequently, its ratio of debt to equity book value, because the equity 
book value does not increases. In other words, the value brought by growth 
opportunities is reflected in firm’s market value, which facilitates the access to debt and 
increases the nominator of the debt to book value of equity ratio. Since the denominator 
remains the same, it is possible to find that positive relation. 
2.4.8. Companies’ Age 
Some authors also discovered that firm’s age can be an explanatory variable for 
leverage and that there is an inverse relation between them. The rationale, according to 
Petersen and Rajan (1994)
14
, is that old firms collect retained earnings and young firms 
need to raise external funds. Michaelas et al. (1999) and Hall et al. (2004) proved this 
negative relationship.  
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 Petersen and Rajan (1994) defended that the older a firm is, the closer the relations with financial 
institutions would be, which would lead to lower costs of capital and higher availability of funds. 
Nevertheless, they found a negative relation between firm’s debt ratios and age. 
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2.4.9. Advertising and R&D Expenditures 
Another determinant also pointed in the literature is the advertising and R&D 
expenditures, which have a negative impact on debt level, as was found by Bradley et 
al. (1984) and Chui et al (2002). 
2.4.10. Industry Effect 
The industry where the firms operate also impacts the level of debt, which is reasonable 
since in the same industry companies tend to use the same assets, are affected by the 
same risks and have similar external funds’ needs (Myers, 1984). Ferri and Jones 
(1979), Bradley et al. (1984), Michaelas et al. (1999) and Chui et al. (2002) concluded 
that the type of industry affects a firm’s capital structure. For Frank and Goyal (2009) 
the median industry leverage has a positive and significant impact on firm leverage. 
2.5. Countries’ Related Determinants of Capital Structure 
Several studies (Chui et al., 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2009 or Fan et al., 2012, for 
example) have tried to find if countries’ institutions and characteristics also affect the 
level of gearing. This work aims to analyze how the sovereign debt affects the 
companies’ financing decisions. 
2.5.1. Countries’ Institutions and Characteristics 
Mcclure et al. (1999) and Hall et al. (2004), using data from different countries, showed 
that the determinants of capital structure affects differently the companies’ capital 
structure according to the institutions and characteristics of each country. 
Fan et al. (2012) showed that leverage is positively related to economic development, 
corruption level and to the existence of an explicit bankruptcy code. Other authors 
emphasized the role of national cultures on corporate capital structures. Chui et al. 
(2002) state that the “culture affects management´s perception of the cost and risk 
related to debt finance, and agency problems in each country” (p. 100). They found that 
the debt ratio is negatively related to the levels of conservatism and mastery of a 
country. Moreover, the macroeconomic conditions, like the inflation expectations, affect 
positively the gearing (Frank and Goyal, 2009). Bancel and Mittoo (2004) found that 
the differences in the quality of the legal system accounts for the cross-country 
differences on the determinants of capital structure. Those disparities are found between 
Scandinavian and non-Scandinavian countries. Regarding this, Fan et al. (2012) found a 
negative relation between common law systems and leverage, because these countries 
tend to use more equity than civil-law countries. 
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2.5.2. Countries’ level of debt 
Does the sovereign debt level influence the amount of debt that a company has? A 
company in a more indebted country may have higher tendency to increase its leverage, 
however it also faces higher interest rates. 
The recent financial crisis originated a sovereign debt crisis in Europe because 
governments, mainly in Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Spain and Cyprus, bailed out 
bankrupt banks, increasing their public debt, to a percentage higher than 60% of the 
GDP. Their bond yields also rose (Kantar et al., 2014). According to Dell’Erba et al. 
(2013), there is a positive relation between the spreads and the level of debt in emerging 
and advanced economies, but is bigger in the formers. In the advanced economies the 
relation is stronger in the Eurozone countries (mainly in Greece, Portugal, Italy and 
Spain) then in Non-Eurozone countries. The authors also found that after the financial 
crisis the spreads strengthened their relation with debt levels in the euro area, but 
decreased outside. 
The increments in the bond yields increased the difficulty faced by the government to 
repay its debt, since the costs of new issuances became much higher, leading to 
austerity programs that were similar across the intervened nations (Apergis and Cooray, 
2014).  
Furthermore, financial markets may be unwilling to lend money to banks and 
companies in countries under assistance programs, which are mainly located in the 
south of Europe. So, in the beginning of the assistance program it was expected that 
firms in this region would implement a deleveraging process and so should have lower 
amounts of debt by the end of the program. However, according to the IMF
15
, from 
2009 to 2013, the decrease in debt in Portuguese companies was lower than the average 
in the euro area. So, the actual impact of the sovereign debt in companies’ leverage is 
not completely defined.  
For Moro (2014), eurozone countries are completely separated into the “prosperous 
North” and “the austerity-hit South” (p. S23). This division also applies to the 
characteristics of their people: while “northerners are more likely to be thrifty, dour, 
cold, honest [and] hard-working”, southerners “are spendthrift, warmer, more fun-
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 Global Financial Stability Report released on 8 October 2014. 
 15 
 
loving, lazier [and] less honest”16. Those differences may lie on the basis of the recent 
crisis. 
Given this, it will be interesting to know if the determinants of capital structure of 
companies in the north are different from those of southern companies, and if the level 
of public debt is a significant explanatory variable of the firms’ debt levels. As such, the 
goals of this work are: i) find if southern companies use more or less debt than northern 
ones; ii) analyze if there are differences in the determinants of capital structure between 
the two groups of countries; iii) define which determinants are more relevant in each 
group of countries.  
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 “Why is it grim up north?” – published on The Economist on 4th May 2010 
(http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2010/05/north_v_south). 
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3. Methodology and Sample 
3.1. Model specification 
In order to determine the factors that have a stronger influence in the capital structure 
decision of European firms and to see if those factors are the same in northern and in 
southern companies, a model
17
 for each country will be estimated. Additionally, a 
model for all countries will be estimated. In this last case, a dummy variable (that equals 
1 if the company belongs to the north) is introduced to see if the determinants differ 
across Europe.  
The first model estimated for each country is the following: 
𝐷𝑖 =  𝛽1 +  𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 +  𝛽5𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖
+  𝛽6𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 +   𝛽7𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖   
[1] 
 
The dependent variable is the ratio between Total Debt and Total Assets, as was 
proposed by Ferri and Jones (1979). This variable is calculated using book values, to 
avoid  the movements in financial markets. 
The explanatory variables are those found in the previous studies as the main 
determinants of capital structure: 
 Company’s size is proxied by the natural logarithm of book value of total assets. 
Ferri and Jones (1979), Michaelas et al. (1999), Hall et al. (2004), Frank and Goyal 
(2009) and Fan et al. (2012) used the total assets to measure size. The use of the 
natural logarithm, according to Wooldridge (2002), allows to  restrict the range of 
the variable, making the estimates less sensitive to extreme observations on the 
variables; 
 Tangibility that corresponds to the ratio between fixed assets and total assets, 
following the approach of Michaelas et al. (1999), Hall et al. (2004) and Fan et al. 
(2012); 
                                                          
17
 The models were estimated using the software EViews. 
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 Profitability is proxied by the ratio between earnings before interests and taxes 
(EBIT) and the total assets. This ratio was used by Chui et al. (2002). The use of 
EBIT, instead of other measures of earnings, is justified by the fact that it allows to 
compare companies with different capital structures; 
 Effective tax rate that corresponds to the ratio between the taxes paid and the 
earnings before taxes, as was proposed by Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre 
(2014); 
 Growth opportunities are proxied by the market-to-book ratio (MtB), following the 
suggestion of Rajan and Zingales (1995), Frank and Goyal (2009) and Fan et al. 
(2012). 
 Non debt tax shield are calculated dividing the depreciation expenses by the total 
assets. This approach was used by Michaelas et al. (1999) and Ozkan (2001); 
 Level of public debt18 that corresponds to the government gross nominal 
consolidated debt, as a percentage of the country gross domestic product (GDP). 
Year fixed effects are included in the regressions through the use of year dummy 
variables.  
Additionally, in order to see if the level of indebtedness varies from the north to the 
south, the following is estimated: 
𝐷𝑖 =  𝛽1 +  𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 +  𝛽5𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖
+  𝛽6𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 +  𝛽7𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖
+ 𝛽8 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 (%𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖 +  𝛽9𝑁𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖  
[2] 
Where the new variable, (𝑁𝑖), takes the value 1 (one) if the company belongs to the 
north of Europe and 0 (zero) otherwise. 
Finally, to complement the analysis, in addition to the additive dummy variable (𝑁𝑖), 
this dummy will be introduced in the multiplicative way, with the purpose of seeing if 
the differences in the determinants of capital structure between the northern and the 
southern companies are statistically significant: 
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 This variable will appear in the next model. 
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𝐷𝑖 =  𝛽1 +  𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 +  𝛽5𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖
+  𝛽6𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑁𝑜 𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖
+ 𝛽8 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 (%𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖
+ 𝛽9𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑁𝑖 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑁𝑖 × 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑁𝑖
× 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽13𝑁𝑖 × 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽14𝑁𝑖
× 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽15𝑁𝑖 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽16𝑁𝑖
× 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 (%𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 
[3] 
Dummy variables that control for year fixed effects are also included.  
3.2. Sample and data 
The sample of this study is composed by 236 non-financial companies listed in the main 
stock indexes of 12 European countries (Germany, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Netherlands, Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Italy). Financial companies 
are excluded from the sample because they have to comply with minimum capital 
requirements that affect their capital structure, which means that it does not depends on 
the discretion of the managers. Germany, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Netherlands and 
France
19
 will be considered as northern countries, and Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Italy as southern countries.  
The data was collected from Datastream between 2010 and 2013, in an annual basis, 
and corresponds to the non-financial companies for which accounting data necessary to 
calculate the dependent variable (the ratio between total debt and total assets) and the 
explanatory variables (the companies’ size, the assets’ tangibility, the profitability, the 
effective tax rate, the growth opportunities and the non-debt tax shields) was available. 
Additionally, information related to public debt as a percentage of GDP for each 
country was gathered from the same data base. 
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 The classification of France as a northern or a southern country is not clear-cut. As was said in the 
introduction, Moro (2014) considers that France belongs to “the austerity-hit South”. However, Apergis 
and Cooray (2014) argued that, contrary to what happened in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and 
Cyprus, France was not affected by financial assistance programs and to austerity measures (that were 
implemented because the sovereign debt in those countries was extremely high). Besides, other authors 
like Engler et al. (2014) also consider France as a northern country, as well as Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
Germany and Netherlands. For those authors, the southern Europe is composed by Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain. 
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Mean 
(%)
Median 
(%)
Max 
(%)
Min 
(%)
Std. 
Dev
Mean 
(%)
Median 
(%)
Max 
(%)
Min 
(%)
Std. 
Dev
Mean 
(%)
Median 
(%)
Max 
(%)
Min 
(%)
Std. 
Dev
2010 24.7 23.1 78.4 0.0 0.02 32.2 31.1 73.9 0.12 0.18 28.1 26.0 78.4 0.12 0.16
2011 24.8 23.1 83.8 0.0 0.02 35.2 32.5 279.3 0.07 0.29 29.6 26.7 279.3 0.07 0.23
2012 25.0 23.5 94.7 0.0 0.02 35.4 33.2 216.2 0.01 0.25 29.8 27.3 216.2 0.01 0.20
2013 25.4 24.4 116.5 0.0 0.02 33.5 32.0 166.8 0.04 0.21 29.2 27.4 167.0 0.04 0.19
Year
North South Total sample
4. Analysis of the results 
4.1. Descriptive analysis of the sample 
Table 1 shows the average ratio between total debt and total assets (in percentage) for 
the group of northern and southern companies, as well as other descriptive statistics 
regarding this ratio. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the ratio Total debt/Total assets 
 
As it is possible to see, southern companies have higher debt ratios than northern 
companies.  
In what concerns the evolution of the debt ratio through the years, it increased in 
northern companies during the whole period of analysis. In southern companies the debt 
ratio increased from 2010 to 2012, but decreased in the last year of the study. This may 
be a consequence of the austerity measures that were implemented in some of the 
countries and a result of additional difficulties to access credit. However, as argued 
before, the actual impact of the sovereign debt in companies leverage is not completely 
defined, as the decrease on debt would be expected to happen earlier.  
Table 2 shows the average level of public debt as percentage of GDP (% GDP) for the 
same group of countries and other descriptive statistics for this ratio.  
As was expected, the level of public debt is higher in the south of Europe. Besides, there 
was an increment in the level of public debt through the years in the north and in the 
south of Europe, and, consequently, in the overal sample. The result in the south of 
Europe is contrary to what was expected by the assistance programs implemented in 
Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus, Spain or Italy.   
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Mean 
(%)
Median 
(%)
Max 
(%)
Min 
(%)
Std. 
Dev
Mean 
(%)
Median 
(%)
Max 
(%)
Min 
(%)
Std. 
Dev
Mean 
(%)
Median 
(%)
Max 
(%)
Min 
(%)
Std. 
Dev
2010 75.2 82.5 96.6 48.8 221.1 96.8 94.0 148.3 61.3 30.5 85.3 82.7 148.3 48.8 25.9
2011 76.4 80.0 99.2 49.3 231.5 107.2 108.2 170.3 70.5 32.7 90.7 86.2 170.3 49.3 29.3
2012 79.6 81.0 101.1 53.6 210.5 116.0 124.1 157.2 86 24.2 96.5 90.6 157.2 53.6 26.7
2013 80.8 78.4 101.5 57.0 197.1 125.8 129.0 175.1 93.9 25.0 101.8 93.9 175.1 57 30.1
Year
North South Total sample
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the level of public debt (%GDP) 
 
Finally, Table 3 presents the discriptive statistics of this study main variables. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the variables
20
 
 
Table 3 allows to conclude that northern companies have, on average, lower levels of 
debt (as stated before), are larger than southern companies and have lower percentage of 
fixed assets. Besides, they are more profitable.  
The Table 3 also shows the presence of extreme values, mainly in the variables effective 
tax rate and growth opportunities
21
.  
Regarding the non-debt tax shield, there are not relevant conclusions to take: its mean, 
median, minimum and maximum values are similar in both groups of countries. 
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 In appendix B are presented the descriptive statistics for each country individually. 
21
 Given these extreme values it was decided to winsorize all variables (except the size, as it corresponds 
to the natural logarithm of total assets). The chosen percentile was 99. However, the models estimated for 
each country do not include the variables winsorized, because for the countries with smaller samples it 
was not possible to follow this approach. 
Mean Median Max Min
Standard 
deviation
Mean Median Max Min
Standard 
deviation
Mean Median Max Min
Standard 
deviation
Total debt/ 
Total assets
 0.2498  0.2338  1.1654  0.0025  0.1393  0.3409  0.3284  2.7931  0  0.2375 0.2918 0.2699 2.7931 0 0.1961
Size  16.4297 16.4183  19.5798 13.2272 1.4079  15.1377  15.2692  18.9236  9.5818  1.8028 15.8334 15.8284 19.5798 9.5818 1.7262
Tan  0.2620  0.2552 0.8341 0 0.1604  0.3517  0.3413  0.9340  0  0.2288 0.3033 0.2796 0.9340 0 0.1999
Profit  0.0739  0.0709 0.3653  -0.1003  0.0539  0.0711  0.0637  0.7345  -0.2102  0.0761 0.0726 0.0673 0.7345  -0.2102 0.0651
Effective tax 
rate
 18.42%  25.27%  1136%  -3267%  1.6076  11.89%  24.51% 890.41%  -2807%  1.7397 15.42% 24.95% 1136% -3267% 1.6689
Growth 
opportunitie
s
 1.9528  1.7  14.73  -12.08  1.5867  3.4409  1.21 608.9 0 29.7740 2.6299 1.53 608.9 -12.08 20.1171
NDTS  0.0422  0.0391  0.1467  0  0.0221  0.042  0.0367  0.1893  0  0.0287 0.0421 0.0379 0.1893 0 0.0254
Total sampleNorth SouthDescriptive 
statistics/ 
Variables
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4.2 Estimation results 
4.2.1 Estimation results for each country 
The results of the estimation of model [1] are presented in Table 4. 
Regarding northern countries/companies, the capital structure determinants that appear 
more often as significant in explaining the debt ratio are the growth opportunities and 
the non-debt tax shields. The impact of the growth opportunities means that the 
managers of these companies track the evolution of the market-to-book ratio to choose 
their source of funds. Besides, the negative impact of growth opportunities on debt level 
may also be justified by the evidence that northern companies have lower percentage of 
fixed assets – as growth opportunities are related to the existence of intangible assets 
that cannot be used as collateral in debt contracts, lenders will demand higher interest 
rates, leading to a decrease in the level of gearing (Zurigat, 2009). Netherlands is the 
only northern country where the impact of the growth opportunities on debt is positive, 
which is against the expectations. Moreover, the relation between the non-debt tax 
shields and debt level is positive in all of the northern countries, which is also against 
the expectations. According to Bradley et al. (1984) this happens because the firms that 
have higher amounts of depreciations are the same firms that have higher values of 
tangible assets and they can easily access to bank loans and get friendly interest rates. In 
fact, the impact of tangibility on debt is always positive (except on Germany).  
Regarding southern countries/companies, the capital structure determinants that appear 
more often as significant in explaining the level of leverage are the firms’ size and the 
effective tax rate. When significant, the variable size impacts positively on debt in all 
countries, except in Ireland, meaning that larger Irish companies have lower amounts of 
debt on their capital structure. Besides, when significant, the variable effective tax rate 
is always positively related to leverage, except in Portugal. This opposite relation may 
be due to the fact that higher taxes decrease the internal funds, increase the cost of 
capital and, consequently, decrease the amount of debt. 
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Table 4: Estimation results for each country 
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4.2.2 Estimation results for the whole sample with an additive dummy 
In order to analyze if the level of indebtedness varies from the north to the south, the 
results of the model [2] are presented in Table 5.  
According to appendix C none of the explanatory variables are extremely correlated, 
except the Level of public debt (% GDP) and the geographic dummy (dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 if the company belongs to a northern country and 0 if the company 
belongs to a southern country), which makes sense since it indicates that northern 
countries have lower levels of public debt. This correlation was expected and so the 
model [2] was estimated first using alternatively each variable and then including both 
variables. 
Looking at the models where the variables level of public debt (%GDP) and the 
geographical dummy are used alternatively, it is possible to see that the variables 
companies’ profitability and non-debt tax shields are significant in both models. 
Besides, when included, the alternative variables are also significant. The differences lie 
on the variables tangibility and size, as the former is significant in the first model and 
the latter is significant in the second. 
Table 5 also shows that when the two variables are used simultaneously, the results are 
very similar to the results of the model that includes the geographical dummy, as the 
significant explanatory variables are the same and the level of public debt (%GDP) 
becomes not significant. Moreover, the impact of this variable on firms’ debt level 
changes and becomes negative, which is a consequence of the multicollinearity that 
exists between the dummy variable and the level of public debt. 
It is also worth noting that the results presented in Table 5 show the model with the 
level of sovereign debt has a lower adjusted R^2 than the model with the geographical 
dummy, and so the next models estimated will include this last dummy variable instead 
of the public debt variable. 
As such, focusing on the results of the second model of Table 5, there is a positive 
relation between the companies’ size and the debt level, meaning that larger companies 
have higher amounts of gearing on their capital structure. This is in accordance with the 
Trade-off Theory and with the results of Fan et al. (2012) and Acedo-Ramírez and Ruíz 
Cabestre (2014), who found a positive and significant relation between firms’ size and 
debt level, both in Continental Europe and in UK. Moreover, profitability and debt are 
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negatively related, as predicted by the POT. Fan et al. (2012) and Hall et al. (2004) also 
found a negative relation between profitability and debt, and between profitability and 
short-term debt, respectively. 
The non-debt tax shield impacts positively on the debt level, which is against the 
prediction of the Trade-off Theory, and confirms the statement of Bradley et al. (1984). 
Finally, the dummy variable indicates that northern companies have lower amounts of 
debt on their financial structure, even after controlling for the main capital structure 
determinants. 
Table 5: Estimation results of the model with additive dummy
22
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 Some experiments were made where some explanatory variables (namely the firm’s size, the tangibility 
and the non-debt tax shields) were excluded, in order to know if the results hold using different 
regressors. It was possible to conclude that the significant explanatory variables are the same and the 
adjustment of the model (measure by the adjusted R^2) is similar. See appendix D. 
This table indicates the estimated coefficients for each 
regressor. Between () is presented the p-value. ***  - 
the variable is significant at 1%; ** - the variable is 
significant at 5%; * - the variable is significant at 10%. 
N corresponds to the number of observations included 
in each estimation. 
Country/ 
Variables
Expected 
sign
All 
countries 
(excluding 
Dnorth)
All countries 
(excluding 
Level of Public 
debt - %GDP)
All countries 
(all 
variables)
Size  +
 0.0056 
(0.4174)
 0.0137* 
(0.0631)
 0.0140* 
(0.0591)
Tan  +
 0.1149** 
(0.0167)
 0.0772 
(0.1194)
 0.0794 
(0.1033)
Profit  -
 -0.5679*** 
(0.0000)
 -0.5027*** 
(0.0002)
 -0.4850*** 
(0.0004)
Effective tax 
rate
 +
 0.0008 
(0.9436)
 0.0019 
(0.8620)
 0.0025 
(0.8196)
Growth 
opportunities
 -
 -0.0028 
(0.5166)
 -0.0044 
(0.3125)
 -0.0050 
(0.2625)
NDTS  -
 0.8935* 
(0.0650)
 0.9743* 
(0.0592)
 0.9801* 
(0.0606)
Level of Public 
debt (%GDP)
+
 0.0006** 
(0.0191)
 ----
 -0.0004 
(0.3671)
Dnorth  ----
 -0.0929*** 
(0.0000)
 -0.1050*** 
(0.0003)
c
 0.1188 
(0.3175)
 0.1031 
(0.3855)
 0.1331 
(0.2735)
Year Fixed 
Effects
Included Included Included
N 901 901 901
adjusted R^2 0.1171 0.1726 0.1740
F-statistic
5.4720*** 
(0.0000)
8.1580*** 
(0.0000)
7.5886*** 
(0.0000)
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4.2.3 Estimation results for the whole sample with an additive and multiplicative 
dummy 
Finally, model [3], that uses an interactive/multiplicative effect between the dummy 𝑁𝑖 
and the other exogenous variables, was estimated and the results are presented in Table 
623. The coefficients of those interactive variables indicate the differences in the 
respective regressor in northern companies with respect to the southern ones.  
According to the results presented in Table 6 it is possible to conclude that the 
significant explanatory variables are the firms’ size, the profitability and the interaction 
between the geographic dummy variable and the non-debt tax shields. Specifically, 
there is a positive relation between size and debt level in southern companies (in 
northern ones, the effect is still positive, but weaker), which is in accordance to the 
predictions of the Trade-off Theory.  
Besides, profitability and leverage are negatively related, as predicted by the POT, both 
in southern and in northern firms. Regarding the effect of the non-debt tax shields on 
debt level, it is significant and positive in northern countries.  
Aiming to know if there is a structural break in the model, that is, if there are 
differences in the regression coefficients of the two groups of countries, a Chow-test 
was preformed, using the variables of model [3]. The hypotheses under analysis are: 
𝐻0: 𝛽𝑖
𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ = 𝛽𝑖
𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ, ∀ 𝑖 = 1, … , 14 
𝐻1: ∃𝑖 ∶  𝛽𝑖
𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ ≠ 𝛽𝑖
𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ, 𝑖 = 1, … ,14 
The results obtained led to the rejection of H0. As such, one can infer that there are 
differences in the coefficients estimated for northern and southern companies.  
Given the fact that the significant explanatory variables vary from the north to the south, 
and considering the results of the Chow-test, one of the goals of this dissertation was 
reached: analyze if there are differences in the determinants of capital structure between 
the groups of countries considered. 
                                                          
23
 Some adjustments were made to model [3] to take into account the exclusion of the variable level of 
public debt (%GDP). 
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Table 6: Estimation results of the model with additive and multiplicative dummy 
variables24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 Again, some experiments were made where some explanatory variables (namely the firm’s size, the 
tangibility and the non-debt tax shields) were excluded, in order to know if the results hold using different 
regressors. It was possible to conclude that the significant explanatory variables do not change too much 
and the adjustment of the models (measure by the adjusted R^2) are similar. Nevertheless, it is worth 
mentioning that the additive dummy variable is significant in the model without the variable size and is 
negatively related to gearing, indicating that, ceteris paribus, northern companies have lower amounts of 
debt in their capital structures, as already found. See appendix E. 
This table indicates the estimated coefficients for 
each regressor. Between () is presented the p-value. 
***  - the variable is significant at 1%; ** - the 
variable is significant at 5%; * - the variable is 
significant at 10%. N corresponds to the number of 
observations included in each estimation. 
Country/ Variable Expected sign All countries 
Size +
 0.0205* 
(0.0696)
Tan +
 0.0194 
(0.7678)
Profit -
 -0.6688*** 
(0.0009)
Effective tax rate +
 0.0065 
(0.6831)
Growth opportunities -
 -0.0018 
(0.7178)
NDTS -
 0.1130 
(0.8694)
Dnorth
 -0.0384 
(0.8587)
Dnorth x Size
 -0.0120 
(0.3652)
Dnorth x Tan
 0.1316 
(0.1429)
Dnorth x Profit
 0.3179 
(0.2169)
Dnorth x Effective tax 
rate
 -0.0078 
(0.7354)
Dnorth x Growth 
opportunities
 -0.0003 
(0.9732)
Dnorth x NDTS
 1.7431* 
(0.0637)
c
 0.0616 
(0.7324)
Year Fixed Effects Included
N 901
Adjusted R^2 0.1999
F-Statistic
7.2338*** 
(0.0000)
Chow-test
15.8244*** 
(0.0000)
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[0, 50[ [50, 100[ [100, 150[ [150, 200] Total
0 0 167 225 48 440
1 44 434 26 0 504
Total 44 601 251 48 944
Level of public debt (%GDP)
Dnorth
4.3 Additional tests 
Although there is a correlation between the level of public debt (%GDP) and the 
country’s location (North/South), the correlation is not perfect and so there are 
observations from southern countries with low level of public debt and observations 
from northern countries with high levels of public debt. As shown in table 7 there are 
167 observations from southern countries (𝑁𝑖 = 0) with a level of public debt lower than 
100% of GDP and 26 observations from northern countries (𝑁𝑖 = 1) with a level of 
public debt higher than 100% of GDP. 
Table 7: Number of observations under the dichotomy north/south and level of public 
debt (%GDP) 
 
Taking into account that evidence, we decided to separate our sample according to the 
level of public debt (%GDP) and according to the location of the country.  
𝐷𝑛 > 100𝑖 = {
 1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 (%𝐺𝐷𝑃) 𝑖𝑠 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 100%
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
𝐷𝑠 < 100𝑖 = {
 1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 (%𝐺𝐷𝑃) 𝑖𝑠 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 100%
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
𝐷𝑠 > 100𝑖 = {
 1,        𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 (%𝐺𝐷𝑃) 𝑖𝑠 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 100%
0,       𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
In this case, the base category corresponds to an observation that belongs to the north of 
Europe and the Level of public debt (%GDP) is lower than 100%. 
First, these variables were included in the additive way, and the model [4] was 
estimated: 
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𝐷𝑖 =  𝛽1 +  𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 +  𝛽5𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽6𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽7𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖
+  𝛽8𝐷𝑛 > 100𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑠 < 100𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐷𝑠 > 100𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 
[4] 
Additionally, the interaction between the dummies and the other explanatory variables 
was taken into account, and the model [5] was estimated. 
𝐷𝑖 =  𝛽1 +  𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 +  𝛽5𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽6𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 +  𝛽7𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖
+  𝛽8𝐷𝑛 > 100𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑠 < 100𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐷𝑠 > 100𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐷𝑛 > 100𝑖
× 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽12𝐷𝑛 > 100𝑖 × 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽13𝐷𝑛 > 100𝑖
× 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽14𝐷𝑛 > 100𝑖 × 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽15𝐷𝑛 > 100𝑖 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽16𝐷𝑛 > 100𝑖
× 𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽17𝐷𝑠 < 100𝑖 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽18𝐷𝑠 < 100𝑖
× 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽19𝐷𝑠 < 100𝑖 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽20𝐷𝑠 < 100𝑖
× 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽21𝐷𝑠 < 100𝑖 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖
+ 𝛽22𝐷𝑠 < 100𝑖 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽23𝐷𝑠 > 100𝑖 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽24𝐷𝑠 > 100𝑖 × 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽25𝐷𝑠 > 100𝑖 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
+ 𝛽26𝐷𝑠 > 100𝑖 × 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽27𝐷𝑠 > 100𝑖
× 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽28𝐷𝑠 > 100𝑖 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖
+ 𝑢𝑖 
[5] 
The results obtained are presented in Table 8
25
. 
The analysis of the simple model suggest that there is a positive relation between firm 
size and debt level, which is in accordance to the Trade-off Theory. Moreover, 
profitability impacts negativelly on the level of gearing, as predicted by the POT. 
Besides, the relation between the non-debt tax sheilds and debt is positive, which 
                                                          
25 Again, some experiments were made where some explanatory variables (namely the firm’s size, the 
tangibility and the non-debt tax shields) were excluded, in order to know if the results hold using different 
regressors. It was possible to conclude that the significant explanatory variables do not change too much 
and the adjustment of the models (measure by the adjusted R^2) are similar. Nevertheless, it is worth 
mentioning that in the multiplicative model, the additive dummies for the south are significant only when 
size is excluded and they are positively related to debt, reinforcing the conclusion that southern 
companies have more debt on their capital structure than northern ones. See appendix F. 
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supports the results of Bradley et al. (1984). The model also reinforce previous findings 
that companies from southern countries, independently of the country debt level, have 
higher amounts of debt in their capital structures than a company from a northern 
country.  
The results of the multiplicative model are richer and suggest that tangibility impacts 
positively on leverage in northern companies that belong to countries with levels of 
public debt lower than 100% of GDP, meaning that in those countries, the existence of 
fixed assets that can be used as collateral is relevant in debt contracts. In opposition, in 
southern companies that belong to countries where the sovereign debt is higher than 
100% of GDP, the relation between tangibility and debt level is negative.  
Regarding profitability, and as predicted by the POT, in the companies from a northern 
country with low level of public debt (the base category) there is a negative relation 
between profitability and the level of gearing.  
Moreover, in the base category, there is a positive relation between the existence non-
debt tax shield and the debt ratio. Knowing that these non-debt tax shields are 
associated with depreciations, which are related to the existence of fixed assets, the 
impact of tangibility on debt in this category is justified. Nevertheless, this relation 
becomes negative in companies belonging to southern countries where the level of 
sovereign debt is lower than 100% of GDP.  
Finaly, the coefficient associated to the variable size is only significant in the group of 
companies from southern countries associated with levels of public debt lower than 
100% of GDP. For these companies the size has a positive impact on debt level.  
Again, the Chow-test led to the rejection of H0, meaning that there are differences in the 
coefficients of the determinants of capital structure between the four categories of 
companies considered. This supports the previous results. 
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Table 8: Estimation results of the additional tests 
 
  
This table indicates the estimated coefficients for 
each regressor. Between () is presented the p-
value. ***  - the variable is significant at 1%; ** - 
the variable is significant at 5%; * - the variable is 
significant at 10%. N corresponds to the number of 
observations included in each estimation. 
Country/ Variables
Expected 
sign
All countries 
(additive 
dummies)
All countries 
(additive and 
multiplicative 
dummies)
Size +
 0.0139* 
(0.0585)
 0.0096 
(0.1432)
Tan +
 0.0766 
(0.1191)
 0.1653*** 
(0.0035)
Profit -
 -0.5010*** 
(0.0003)
 -0.3868** 
(0.0202)
Effective tax rate +
 0.0023 
(0.8404)
 -0.0024 
(0.8796)
Growth opportunities -
 -0.0044 
(0.3176)
 0.0025 
(0.8030)
NDTS -
 0.9545* 
(0.0612)
 1.7613*** 
(0.0004)
Dn>100
 0.0365 
(0.4827)
 -0.0911 
(0.8450)
Ds<100
 0.1008*** 
(0.0014)
 -0.2020 
(0.3094)
Ds>100
 0.0915*** 
(0.0000)
 0.3163 
(0.2896)
c
 0.0062 
(0.9604)
 -0.0010 
(0.9927)
Dn>100 x Size
 0.0175 
(0.5498)
Dn>100 x Tan
 -0.2599 
(0.4279)
Dn>100 x Profit
 1.6943 
(0.2707)
Dn>100 x Effective tax 
rate
 0.0081 
(0.9338)
Dn>100 x Growth 
opportunities
 -0.1249 
(0.1155)
Dn>100 x NDTS
 -0.1977 
(0.9131)
Ds<100 x Size
 0.0282** 
(0.0235)
Ds<100 x Tan
 -0.0423 
(0.6924)
Ds<100 x Profit
 -0.1864 
(0.5983)
Ds<100 x Effective tax 
rate
 -0.0086 
(0.7757)
Ds<100 x Growth 
opportunities
 -0.0002 
(0.9830)
Ds<100 x NDTS
 -2.7482*** 
(0.0070)
Ds>100 x Size
 -0.0059 
(0.7473)
Ds>100 x Tan
 -0.2041** 
(0.0369)
Ds>100 x Profit
 -0.3514 
(0.2382)
Ds>100 x Effective tax 
rate
 0.0167 
(0.4787)
Ds>100 x Growth 
opportunities
 -0.0099 
(0.4891)
Ds>100 x NDTS
 -0.8046 
(0.3678)
Year Fixed Effects Included Included
N 901 901
Adjusted R^2 0.1724 0.2298
F-Statistic
7.0200*** 
(0.0000)
5.1812*** 
(0.0000)
Chow-test  ----
7.7863*** 
(0.0000)
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5. Conclusions, Limitations and Future Research  
5.1 Conclusions 
The main goal of this research was to find if there are differences in the determinants of 
firms’ capital structure between the north and the south of Europe, as northern countries 
are more prosperous and have lower amounts of sovereign debt, while southern 
countries have higher amounts of sovereign debt (which did not decreased, even under 
assistance programs) 
The main conclusions of this study are related with the evidence that firms from 
southern Europe have higher levels of debt in their capital structures than the firms from 
northern Europe, even after controlling for the factors that can justify different levels of 
indebtedness. Besides, when all countries/companies were joined, the results showed 
that there are differences in the determinants of firms’ capital structures between 
northern and southern companies. Specifically, the debt level in southern companies is 
mainly determined by their size (Fan et al. (2012) and Acedo-Ramírez and Ruíz-
Cabestre (2014) also found a positive and significant relation between firms’ size and 
debt level, both in Continental Europe and in UK) and profitability (Fan et al. (2012) 
and Hall et al. (2004) also found a negative relation between profitability and short-term 
debt), while the existence of non-debt tax shields determines the level of debt of 
northern companies (allowing to infer that the results of Bradley et al.,1984, are better 
supported in this group of nations). So, according to these results, the capital structure 
of southern companies is mainly determined by factors related to the companies (size 
and profitability), while the capital structure of northern companies is mainly 
determined by macroeconomic factors, like the existence of tax shields that come from a 
source different from debt. 
Furthermore, when the companies are separated not only in terms of location but also 
regarding the level of public debt of the country where they are stablished, the 
conclusion that southern companies have higher amounts of debt was reinforced. 
Besides, southern companies’ debt level continues to be determined by firms’ size but 
also by the existence of non-debt tax shields (if the public debt is lower than 100% of 
GDP). Assets’ tangibility plays a determinant role if the company belongs to the south 
and to a country with higher levels of public debt. Regarding northern companies with 
levels of public debt lower than 100% of GDP, their capital structure is determined by 
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assets’ tangibility (meaning that in those firms, the existence of fixed assets that can be 
used as collateral is relevant in debt contracts), profitability and the existence of non-
debt tax shield.  
Apart from the main conclusions, it can also be noted that the differences between 
northern and southern companies do not lie only on the debt levels. In fact, northern 
companies are larger than southern companies, are more profitable and have lower 
percentage of fixed assets.  
It is interesting to note that the results obtained with this study support the findings of 
previous works, either when countries are considered individually, or when the overall 
sample is used. 
5.2 Limitations and Future Research 
One of the limitations of this research is the use of book leverage and the exclusion of 
market leverage. The decision to work with book values has to do with the fact that 
financial markets fluctuate too much. But, according to McClure et al (1999), “financial 
theory clearly supports the use of market values for management decisions.” (pp. 148 
and 149). 
Apart from that, the dynamic model was not used, as the time period of the sample is 
relatively short and there was no interest in knowing how quickly companies adjust to 
their target debt ratio. 
Finally, this work can be extended by including more European countries, and not only 
some of the Eurozone. There is also the possibility to include more years in the sample 
in order to estimate a dynamic model for companies’ capital structure.  
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Appendix 
A – The determinants of capital structure and their impact on the level of debt, 
according to the different theories 
Theory/ 
Determinant 
Trade-off 
Theory 
Pecking Order 
Theory 
Market-
timing Theory 
Expected 
sign 
Size + -  + 
Tangibility + +  + 
Profitability + -  - 
Effective Tax 
Rate 
+   + 
Growth 
Opportunities 
- + - - 
NDTS -   - 
Level of 
Public Debt 
(%GDP) 
   + 
 
B – Descriptive statistics for each country 
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Correlations
Total debt/ 
Total assets
Size Tan Profit
Effective 
tax rate
Growth 
opportunities
NDTS
Level of 
public debt 
(%GDP)
Dnorth
Total debt/ 
Total assets
1  0.0795  0.2197  -0.2449  -0.0155  -0.1405  0.1551  0.1208  -0.2546
Size 1  -0.0359  -0.1402  0.0334  -0.1362  0.0600  -0.1594  0.3708
Tan 1  -0.1375  -0.0366  -0.1409  0.1964  0.1827  -0.2385
Profit 1  0.1184  0.4079  0.0264  0.0236  0.0241
Effective tax 
rate
1  0.0591  0.0719  0.0308  0.0297
Growth 
opportunities
1  0.1394  -0.0424  -0.0225
NDTS 1  0.0207  0.0213
Level of public 
debt (%GDP)
1  -0.5769
Dnorth 1
C - Correlation matrix 
 
 
D – Estimation results of the model with additive dummy and its experiments 
 
 
 
This table indicates the estimated coefficients for each regressor. Between () is presented the p-
value. ***  - the variable is significant at 1%; ** - the variable is significant at 5%; * - the 
variable is significant at 10%. N corresponds to the number of observations included in each 
estimation. 
Country/ 
Variables
Expected 
sign
All 
countries 
(excluding 
Dnorth)
All countries 
(excluding 
Level of Public 
debt - %GDP)
All countries 
(all 
variables)
All countries 
(excluding 
Size)
All countries 
(excluding 
Tan)
All countries 
(excluding 
NDTS)
Size  +
 0.0056 
(0.4174)
 0.0137* 
(0.0631)
 0.0140* 
(0.0591)
 ----
 0.0138* 
(0.0579)
 0.0148** 
(0.0444)
Tan  +
 0.1149** 
(0.0167)
 0.0772 
(0.1194)
 0.0794 
(0.1033)
 0.0788 
(0.1174)
 ----
 0.1081** 
(0.0184)
Profit  -
 -0.5679*** 
(0.0000)
 -0.5027*** 
(0.0002)
 -0.4850*** 
(0.0004)
 -0.5486*** 
(0.0001)
 -0.5214*** 
(0.0001)
 -0.5038*** 
(0.0002)
Effective tax 
rate
 +
 0.0008 
(0.9436)
 0.0019 
(0.8620)
 0.0025 
(0.8196)
 0.0035 
(0.7522)
 0.0012 
(0.9148)
 0.0067 
(0.5443)
Growth 
opportunities
 -
 -0.0028 
(0.5166)
 -0.0044 
(0.3125)
 -0.0050 
(0.2625)
 -0.0055 
(0.1815)
 -0.0055 
(0.2075)
 -0.0024 
(0.6000)
NDTS  -
 0.8935* 
(0.0650)
 0.9743* 
(0.0592)
 0.9801* 
(0.0606)
 1.0343** 
(0.0455)
 1.1154** 
(0.0282)
 ----
Level of Public 
debt (%GDP)
+
 0.0006** 
(0.0191)
 ----
 -0.0004 
(0.3671)
 ----  ----  ----
Dnorth  ----
 -0.0929*** 
(0.0000)
 -0.1050*** 
(0.0003)
 -0.0752*** 
(0.0001)
 -0.1005*** 
(0.0000)
 -0.0899*** 
(0.0000)
c
 0.1188 
(0.3175)
 0.1031 
(0.3855)
 0.1331 
(0.2735)
 0.3125*** 
(0.0000)
 0.1275 
(0.2610)
 0.1085 
(0.3626)
Year Fixed 
Effects
Included Included Included Included Included Included
N 901 901 901 901 901 902
adjusted R^2 0.1171 0.1726 0.1740 0.1556 0.1657 0.1535
F-statistic
5.4720*** 
(0.0000)
8.1580*** 
(0.0000)
7.5886*** 
(0.0000)
8.2059*** 
(0.0000)
7.3559*** 
(0.0000)
8.0851*** 
(0.0000)
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This table indicates the estimated coefficients for each regressor. Between () is presented the p-
value. ***  - the variable is significant at 1%; ** - the variable is significant at 5%; * - the variable 
is significant at 10%. N corresponds to the number of observations included in each estimation. 
Country/ Variable Expected sign All countries 
All 
countries 
(excluding 
Size)
All countries 
(excluding 
Tan)
All countries 
(excluding 
NDTS)
Size +
 0.0205* 
(0.0696)
 ----
 0.0205* 
(0.0695)
 0.0210* 
(0.0626)
Tan +
 0.0194 
(0.7678)
 0.0237 
(0.7300)
 ----
 0.0252 
(0.6865)
Profit -
 -0.6688*** 
(0.0009)
 -0.7113*** 
(0.0006)
 -0.6778*** 
(0.0007)
 -0.6584*** 
(0.0009)
Effective tax rate +
 0.0065 
(0.6831)
 0.0082 
(0.5843)
 0.0062 
(0.6939)
 0.0104 
(0.5146)
Growth opportunities -
 -0.0018 
(0.7178)
 -0.0031 
(0.4934)
 -0.0020 
(0.6946)
 -0.0017 
(0.7289)
NDTS -
 0.1130 
(0.8694)
 0.3048 
(0.6687)
 0.1382 
(0.8378)
 ----
Dnorth
 -0.0384 
(0.8587)
 -0.1989*** 
(0.0002)
 -0.0107 
(0.9597)
 0.0436 
(0.8434)
Dnorth x Size
 -0.0120 
(0.3652)
 ----
 -0.0121 
(0.3618)
 -0.0137 
(0.3108)
Dnorth x Tan
 0.1316 
(0.1429)
 0.1273 
(0.1640)
 ----
 0.2126** 
(0.0147)
Dnorth x Profit
 0.3179 
(0.2169)
 0.3254 
(0.2110)
 0.3623 
(0.1638)
 0.2642 
(0.3161)
Dnorth x Effective tax 
rate
 -0.0078 
(0.7354)
 -0.0085 
(0.7071)
 -0.0087 
(0.7137)
 -0.0092 
(0.6682)
Dnorth x Growth 
opportunities
 -0.0003 
(0.9732)
 -0.0006 
(0.9569)
 -0.0058 
(0.5908)
 0.0014 
(0.9063)
Dnorth x NDTS
 1.7431* 
(0.0637)
 1.5281 
(0.1106)
 2.0641** 
(0.0247)
 ----
c
 0.0616 
(0.7324)
 0.3679*** 
(0.0000)
 0.0684 
(0.6935)
 0.0529 
(0.7688)
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
N 901 901 901 902
Adjusted R^2 0.1999  0.1755 0.1912 0.1699
F-Statistic
7.2338*** 
(0.0000)
7.0336*** 
(0.0000)
7.2811*** 
(0.0000)
7.1666*** 
(0.0000)
Chow-test
15.8244*** 
(0.0000)
13.5460*** 
(0.0000)
20.7617*** 
(0.0000)
15.0059*** 
(0.0000)
E – Estimation results of the model with additive and multiplicative dummy variables 
and its experiments 
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F – Estimation results of the additional tests and its experiments 
 
This table indicates the estimated coefficients for each regressor. Between () is presented the p-value. 
***  - the variable is significant at 1%; ** - the variable is significant at 5%; * - the variable is 
significant at 10%. N corresponds to the number of observations included in each estimation. 
Country/ Variables
Expected 
sign
All countries 
(additive 
dummies)
All countries 
(additive and 
multiplicative 
dummies)
All 
countries 
(Excluding 
Size)
All countries 
(Excluding 
Tan)
All countries 
(Excluding 
NDTS)
All 
countries  
(Excluding 
Size)
All 
countries 
(Excluding 
Tan)
All 
countries 
(Excluding 
NDTS)
Size +
 0.0139* 
(0.0585)
 0.0096 
(0.1432)
 ----
 0.0139* 
(0.0537)
 0.0150** 
(0.0403)
 ----
0.0097 
(0.1381)
 0.0089 
(0.2025)
Tan +
 0.0766 
(0.1191)
 0.1653*** 
(0.0035)
 0.0785 
(0.1162)
 ----
 0.1064** 
(0.0187)
 0.1655*** 
(0.0030)
 ----
 0.2459*** 
(0.0000)
Profit -
 -0.5010*** 
(0.0003)
 -0.3868** 
(0.0202)
 -0.5448*** 
(0.0001)
 -0.5202*** 
(0.0002)
 -0.5031*** 
(0.0002)
 -0.4153** 
(0.0106)
 -0.3483** 
(0.0487)
 -0.4385** 
(0.0159)
Effective tax rate +
 0.0023 
(0.8404)
 -0.0024 
(0.8796)
 0.0039 
(0.7258)
 0.0015 
(0.8942)
 0.0069 
(0.5300)
 -0.0018 
(0.9143)
 -0.0037 
(0.8266)
 -0.0000 
(0.9998)
Growth opportunities -
 -0.0044 
(0.3176)
 0.0025 
(0.8030)
 -0.0055 
(0.1779)
 -0.0054 
(0.2123)
 -0.0023 
(0.6084)
 0.0002 
(0.9807)
 -0.0038 
(0.7243)
 0.0051 
(0.6584)
NDTS -
 0.9545* 
(0.0612)
 1.7613*** 
(0.0004)
 1.0196** 
(0.0470)
 1.0932** 
(0.0292)
 ----
 1.7369*** 
(0.0006)
 2.1626*** 
(0.0000)
 ----
Dn>100
 0.0365 
(0.4827)
 -0.0911 
(0.8450)
 0.0281 
(0.5946)
 0.0387 
(0.4540)
 0.0475 
(0.3887)
 0.1866 
(0.1043)
 -0.1637 
(0.7552)
 -0.1257 
(0.7648)
Ds<100
 0.1008*** 
(0.0014)
 -0.2020 
(0.3094)
 0.0839*** 
(0.0075)
 0.1081*** 
(0.0003)
 0.0989*** 
(0.0011)
 0.2030*** 
(0.0017)
 -0.1985 
(0.2996)
 -0.2749 
(0.1683)
Ds>100
 0.0915*** 
(0.0000)
 0.3163 
(0.2896)
 0.0723*** 
(0.0001)
 0.0994*** 
(0.0000)
 0.0891*** 
(0.0000)
 0.2043*** 
(0.0005)
 0.2711 
(0.3584)
 0.2270 
(0.4483)
c
 0.0062 
(0.9604)
 -0.0010 
(0.9927)
 0.2357*** 
(0.0000)
 0.0225 
(0.8519)
 0.0132 
(0.9159)
 0.1616*** 
(0.0000)
 0.0360 
(0.7529)
 0.0611 
(0.6075)
Dn>100 x Size
 0.0175 
(0.5498)
 ----
 0.0182 
(0.5629)
 0.0204 
(0.4392)
Dn>100 x Tan
 -0.2599 
(0.4279)
  -0.2794 
(0.4170)
 ----
 -0.2426 
(0.2617)
Dn>100 x Profit
 1.6943 
(0.2707)
 1.3452 
(0.3936)
 1.6598 
(0.2791)
 1.9729 
(0.2560)
Dn>100 x Effective tax 
rate
 0.0081 
(0.9338)
 0.0117 
(0.9010)
 0.0051 
(0.9562)
 -0.0145 
(0.8586)
Dn>100 x Growth 
opportunities
 -0.1249 
(0.1155)
 -0.1115 
(0.1681)
 -0.1174 
(0.1271)
 -0.1409 
(0.1432)
Dn>100 x NDTS
 -0.1977 
(0.9131)
 -0.1238 
(0.9459)
 -0.7189 
(0.6412)
 ----
Ds<100 x Size
 0.0282** 
(0.0235)
 ----
 0.0279** 
(0.0200)
 0.0283** 
(0.0230)
Ds<100 x Tan
 -0.0423 
(0.6924)
 -0.0473 
(0.6872)
 ----
 -0.1545 
(0.1403)
Ds<100 x Profit
 -0.1864 
(0.5983)
 -0.1216 
(0.7362)
 -0.2414 
(0.4989)
 -0.1967 
(0.5970)
Ds<100 x Effective tax 
rate
 -0.0086 
(0.7757)
 0.0040 
(0.9113)
 -0.0191 
(0.4916)
 -0.0195 
(0.5245)
Ds<100 x Growth 
opportunities
 -0.0002 
(0.9830)
 0.0021 
(0.8514)
 0.0050 
(0.6581)
 -0.0052 
(0.6618)
Ds<100 x NDTS
 -2.7482*** 
(0.0070)
 -2.6239** 
(0.0256)
 -2.8563*** 
(0.0075)
 ----
Ds>100 x Size
 -0.0059 
(0.7473)
 ----
 -0.0064 
(0.7329)
 -0.0015 
(0.9345)
Ds>100 x Tan
 -0.2041** 
(0.0369)
 -0.2017** 
(0.0439)
 ----
 -0.2746*** 
(0.0037)
Ds>100 x Profit
 -0.3514 
(0.2382)
 -0.3245 
(0.2888)
 -0.3581 
(0.2425)
 -0.3147 
(0.3002)
Ds>100 x Effective tax 
rate
 0.0167 
(0.4787)
 0.0162 
(0.4996)
 0.0171 
(0.4820)
 0.0221 
(0.3332)
Ds>100 x Growth 
opportunities
 -0.0099 
(0.4891)
 -0.0085 
(0.5330)
 -0.0037 
(0.8006)
 -0.0097 
(0.5258)
Ds>100 x NDTS
 -0.8046 
(0.3678)
 -0.7314 
(0.4161)
 -1.2151 
(0.1637)
 ----
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
N 901 901 901 901 902 901 901 902
Adjusted R^2 0.1724 0.2298 0.1551 0.1657 0.1543 0.1911 0.2155 0.1947
F-Statistic
7.0200*** 
(0.0000)
5.1812*** 
(0.0000)
6.9323*** 
(0.0000)
6.4872*** 
(0.0000)
6.9091*** 
(0.0000)
4.9805*** 
(0.0000)
5.4903*** 
(0.0000)
5.4009*** 
(0.0000)
Chow-test  ----
7.7863*** 
(0.0000)
 ----  ----  ----
6.2164*** 
(0.0000)
9.3296*** 
(0.0000)
7.3393*** 
(0.0000)
Additive Multiplicative
